The First Phase of the Anfal Genocide (23 February – 19 March 1988)
The first phase of the Anfal Genocide took place from 23 February to 19 March 1988, when the Iraqi state under the Ba‘ath regime launched large-scale military attacks on the Duly Jafayati region and the Shar Bajêr area, targeting especially the villages of Sergalû and Bargalû from three directions, with heavy shelling and ground assaults.
According to the Ba‘ath regime’s military documents, the operations began between 23–26 February 1988, but eyewitnesses, Peshmerga fighters, and residents of the area stated that the Anfal genocide began effectively on 9 February 1988.
The campaign was commanded by Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad, commander of the First Army Corps, assisted by Lieutenant General Nu’man Faris Hussein, commander of the Fifth Army Corps, under the direct supervision of General Adnan Khairallah (Minister of Defense) and Ali Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau of the Ba‘ath Party. Also involved were General Nizar Abdul Karim al-Khazraji, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and General Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti, Director of Operations.
The initial assault began around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on 23 February, when the people of Yaxsamaru, Sergalû, and Bargalû were awakened in darkness and rain by the thunder of artillery and shelling. Sergalû, a village of about 500 households (around 3,500 inhabitants), had long served as a logistical base for the Peshmerga of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). It was close to the eastern side of the Dokan Dam, a key source of electricity for Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, and contained Peshmerga facilities, warehouses, and roads.
However, the main objective of the regime was not only to seize Peshmerga positions but to destroy the civilian infrastructure of the Doly Jafayati region, including about 25–30 villages.
According to witnesses and Ba‘ath regime records, 200–250 people were killed during these operations. By early March, after capturing the area, the army’s engineering units used bulldozers to razed the villages to the ground. The entire region was blockaded from three sides, leaving only a 12-mile escape corridor toward the Iranian border.
The Ba‘ath army and its local collaborators (so-called “Jash”) surrounded the villages, captured those attempting to flee toward Iran, and executed or detained them. This clearly shows that from the very start of the Anfal Genocide, the regime’s policy aimed at eradicating and depopulating Kurdish villages, in line with Ba‘ath Revolutionary Command Council Decree No. 4008, which authorized mass detentions and bombardment of the so-called “prohibited zones.”
The process of mass disappearance and extermination was not a random event — it was part of a systematic state policy of genocide against the Kurdish people.
On the morning of 23 February, regime ground forces advanced from all directions and launched a full-scale offensive. The attacking army that targeted the Peshmerga supply bases and depots was a large formation that moved along a broad front, with a longitudinal axis stretching for about forty miles toward the eastern basin of the Dokan reservoir, reaching toward Sulaymaniyah and the surrounding small towns. The Peshmerga were able to sustain heavy defensive resistance for more than three weeks, but later the Ba‘ath regime’s forces managed to break through.
According to intelligence reports, local security directorates in Sulaymaniyah and the coordinating staff of the army corps, the regime became aware of a coordinated military cooperation between some Peshmerga units (some of which were alleged to be hired or paid) and the Iranian army. Iraqi intelligence reported that elements of the Revolutionary Guards were operating from their supply bases, and fixed-wing combat aircraft of various types (Sukhoi, Mirage, MiG) were used to strike Peshmerga supply centers and depots. In addition, another type of aircraft — light transport/utility planes (Pilatus), manufactured in Switzerland, was reportedly employed. At certain engagements, 15–20 aircraft would often carry out coordinated strikes on the same targets.
During the aerial phase of the assault, villages that had opened their gates or attempted to flee were hit and set ablaze; later, the regime sent additional waves of aircraft — six more sorties in the afternoon and early evening of that same day — dropping bombs on the area. In those air attacks, it is reported that approximately 28 people were killed and some 300 were wounded.
A powerful combined force was assembled — several brigades and battalions under the command of the corps leadership — supported by heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and air cover. Special units and local collaborators (the so-called “Jash”) participated in the operation. After the military campaign, the regime publicly promoted the events in its media as a success of the First Anfal Genocide operation, and numerous congratulatory messages and demonstrations of support from Jash and pro-regime advisors were sent to Saddam Hussein; state newspapers and magazines celebrated the announced “victory” of the operation across the Kurdistan highlands.
As a result of the ground offensive and the fall of the defensive lines in the Jazireti mountains, many Peshmerga and local villagers fled toward Iran. They faced extremely difficult winter conditions in the high, rugged terrain: hundreds of people — notably women and children — struggled on these harsh routes, suffering losses of life, livestock, and supplies due to the cold and exhaustion. The role of Peshmerga in helping civilians escape under those conditions has been emphasized in eyewitness accounts.
During and after the assault, there were reports — including a later confidential police memo and subsequently released statements — claiming that the regime considered using chemical munitions against Sulaymaniyah and had prepared intelligence summaries alleging that the Peshmerga had caused heavy casualties in Halabja and the Jazireti area. Such reports contributed to the atmosphere of fear and to the regime’s justification for extreme measures.
Large numbers of civilians were thus forced to flee; many who were captured by regime forces suffered the same fate as those captured earlier at the border — detention, execution, or disappearance.
After the collapse of Peshmerga defensive lines in the Jafayati Mountains, Peshmerga forces and thousands of residents fled toward the Iranian border. In the harsh winter, amid snowstorms and freezing cold in those high mountains, hundreds of people — especially women and children — were unable to continue on the difficult mountain passes and lost their lives. Hundreds of men, families, livestock, horses, and mules froze to death in the deep snow. The role of the Peshmerga in assisting civilians to cross these treacherous routes has been emphasized in many survivor testimonies.
During these attacks and military offensives, rumors spread that the regime was planning to destroy the city of Sulaymaniyah and intended to use chemical weapons. Later, a confidential police report referred to such plans, claiming that around 600 Peshmerga fighters in Halabja and the Jafayati Valley had been killed.
Meanwhile, through Radio Peshmerga, warnings were continuously broadcast to civilians about the advancing army and airstrikes, urging them to take shelter. Many civilians were forced to flee, leaving behind their homes and belongings; those captured by the regime were immediately detained or executed. Even some who managed to reach the border were arrested by regime forces and faced the same fate — enforced disappearance or execution.
Less than three weeks after the beginning of the Anfal Genocide, the city of Halabja and its surroundings were subjected to a chemical bombardment, killing about 5,000 civilians and injuring 10,000 others.
During the First Anfal campaign, more than 100 separate attacks were carried out in multiple directions, destroying the districts, villages, and mountain areas of the Doly Jafayati region. The villages and Peshmerga bases that were occupied and destroyed included:
Shakhi Gojar, Gapilon, Qamchoga, Shakh Rash, Dola Root, Qizlar, Qaranguê, Mawlan, Qarasarad, Pirbaiz, Dola Mazala, Qalam Pasha, Asos, Qarachatân, Dola Bi, Shadala, Pîrmegrûn, Zêwe, Garade, Gawrêde, Shakhi Daban, Sharstin, Seydar, Hanjira, Klaw Spi, Sarmord, Maloma, and Chalawa.
On the night of 18–19 March 1988, the First Anfal Genocide Operation officially ended. On 19 March 1988, the regime’s General Command of the Armed Forces issued Military Communiqué No. 3087, declaring a “major and unprecedented victory” over the “saboteurs and hired agents.”Three days later, the Second Anfal Operation began.
After the fall of the Ba‘ath regime in 2003, mass-grave investigations were conducted. On 17 January 2008, the remains of 358 victims of the Anfal Genocide from the villages of the Jafayati Valley and surrounding areas were exhumed near Nugra Salman and reburied with official ceremonies.
After the fall of the Ba‘ath regime, systematic efforts began to locate, exhume, and reinter the mass graves of the victims of the Anfal Genocide. On 17 January 2008, the remains of 358 Anfal victims from the villages of the Doly Jafayati region and its surroundings were exhumed near Nugra Salman, identified, and ceremonially reburied in the district of Dukan.
In 2010, the Anfal Monument of Doly Jafayati was constructed at the burial site in Dukan. The names of 482 Anfal victims were inscribed on the memorial wall as a lasting testament to their memory and to the crimes committed during the Anfal Genocide.
The Second Phase of the Anfal Genocide (22 March – 1 April 1988)
The Second Phase of the Anfal Genocide targeted the Qaradagh region from 22 March to 1 April 1988. According to Ba‘ath regime documents and official reports, the First and Second Anfal Operations received the widest media coverage of that era, portrayed as major “victories.” The Ba‘ath newspaper Al-Thawra (issue no. 6522, dated 3 April 1988) published an article entitled “In the Second Anfal Operation, the Qaradagh Area Was Cleansed of Traitors.” Another report in the same issue declared that “The people of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah send greetings to the heroes of the Anfal Operation.”
Only three days after the end of the First Anfal, Iraqi forces launched a new large-scale offensive under the command of Lieutenant General Iyad Khalil Zaki (commander of the Fifth Army Corps) and Lieutenant General Kamil Sajit (commander of the Second Army Corps), under the direct supervision of General Adnan Khairallah (Minister of Defense) and Ali Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau of the Ba‘ath Party. Other senior officers involved included General Nizar Abdul-Karim al-Khazraji, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; General Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti, Director of Operations; Colonel Zahir Yunis Ali, commander of the 50th Division; and Colonel Saad Shams al-Din, commander of the National Defense brigades in Sulaymaniyah and Qaradagh sectors.
This was a massive military campaign, larger in scope than the First Anfal, aimed at the mountain chain of Qopi Qaradagh. By this time, Iraq had already carried out two major genocidal campaigns — against the Fayli Kurds and the Barzanis — as well as countless other crimes: depopulating Kurdish villages, forced displacement, declaring “prohibited zones,” and systematic terrorization of civilians.
Iraqi intelligence gathered detailed information about Peshmerga bases in Qaradagh, claiming that they provided logistical assistance to Iranian forces. The area had previously been depopulated in 1987, when inhabitants were forcibly relocated to the Nasr and Zarayan complexes, leaving only army units and local collaborators (Jash) — until Peshmerga later regained control.
In February 1988, eight Iraqi aircraft carried out a chemical attack on the villages of Sertake and Balagjar. Witnesses who observed the event described it as follows:
“The planes dropped many bombs — perhaps eight or nine. They made a sharp whistling sound as they fell, and after the explosions, a faint gas spread out. Those who came into contact with it developed blisters on their skin; animals that grazed on contaminated grass collapsed and died instantly. Fortunately, no civilians died, because people had already taken shelter.”
According to reports from the Iraqi regime’s intelligence and security agencies, it was written that “The treacherous group (Hask) had received nearly 1,500 gas masks from the Iranian regime.”
It appears that this assessment and presumption had some tactical impact on the Qaradagh phase of the Anfal campaign, as the availability of these gas masks partially contributed to reducing the number of casualties during the chemical attacks.
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The Chemical Bombardment of the Village of Sewsênan (22–23 March 1988)
The village of Sewsênan, located in the eastern foothills of Qaradagh, was one of the worst-hit targets of the chemical attacks carried out on 22 March 1988, during the Second Phase of the Anfal Genocide.
According to eyewitnesses, at around sunset on 22–23 March, shortly after evening prayers, an intense bombardment began. One survivor described the scene:
“I was standing outside my house facing the village when I saw waves of fire falling on Sewsênan. The bombardment came from the direction of Darbandikhan; the shells were fired in clusters over the village. Out of roughly 350 households — about 1,500 inhabitants — more than 80 people were killed.”
On the following day (23 March), the nearby village of Dukan was also subjected to chemical bombardment. The regime continued its heavy and systematic bombardments throughout the Qaradagh region, followed by ground assaults in the afternoon of 23 March, when the Iraqi army advanced and occupied the area.
Those who tried to escape were divided into two groups. One group fled northward, toward Sulaymaniyah, via rugged mountain paths; they eventually reached safety, though many lost their homes and possessions to looting. The other group fled southward toward Germian, where they were later captured, detained, and disappeared during the Anfal operations.
A report by the Political Bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party listed the names of 66 victims, aged between 1 and 59 years, all from Qaradagh villages, killed in the chemical attacks of 28–29 March 1988 — many of them women, children, and the elderly.
The Qaradagh region was surrounded by army forces. Villagers were divided; some fled toward Mount Glazerd and then to Sulaymaniyah, while others, deceived by army officers who told them they would be taken to “safe camps,” boarded military trucks and buses. Instead, they were transferred to the Toubzawa military camp near Kirkuk, where they were executed or buried in mass graves. The rest of the population, exhausted and ill, moved toward Sangaw and Germian, many dying along the way.
On 1 April 1988, the General Command of the Iraqi Armed Forces issued Communiqué No. 3109, declaring the “complete cleansing of the Qaradagh region from traitors” and the destruction of Peshmerga bases in Taki, Balagjar, Miuli, Bani Murad, Chircha Qala, Homar Qala, Balakan, Daband Faqira, Qaradagh, Oqla, Jafaran, Boxin, Sewsênan, Zarda, Kalosh, Berkê, Klaw Jom‘a, Bakhshê, Darband Basara, Sargarma, Qopi Qaradagh, and Achdakh.
Ba‘ath regime documents later revealed that, on 15 April 1988, a secret order (No. 169) from the Second Infantry Division “Khalid Bin Walid” commanded by Colonel Adnan Naji, requested logistical support — including eight helicopters and twenty transport vehicles — to transfer the 39th Brigade from Piramagrun to Qaradagh, with air defense coverage during the operation scheduled for 20 April 1988.
A follow-up correspondence from the Ministry of Defense (Military Security Directorate, Document No. 48 dated 21 April 1988) confirmed this transfer and requested the establishment of a special security committee to oversee the operation, to be completed within 20 hours. These documents demonstrate the systematic coordination and planning behind the Anfal Genocide operations in the Qaradagh region.
According to another document issued by the First Army Corps under the command of Sultan Hashim, sent to the General Command of the Armed Forces as a secret and urgent letter No. 142 dated 20 April 1988, the following was reported:
“During the cleansing operations in the Qaradagh area, 2,500 detainees and ‘hirelings’ (men and women) were arrested, along with the seizure of a quantity of weapons and ammunition in the Qopi Qaradagh area, as follows:
- 10 DShK / 12.7 mm heavy machine guns with 200 (units of ammunition).
- 200 Kalashnikov rifles.
- 1,000 ‘romana’ (ammunition units).
These detainees, as well as the weapons and ammunition, have been placed in the custody of the Corps headquarters. We await your instructions in this regard. End.”
In response, the General Command of the Armed Forces sent letter No. 2/م خ dated 23 April 1988 to the command of the First Army Corps, stating:
“With reference to your secret and urgent letter No. 142 dated 20/4/1988 regarding the 2,500 detainees and hirelings, they shall be distributed as follows:
• Men are to be transferred to the Command of the Fourth Army Corps.
• Women are to be transferred to the Command of the Third Army Corps.
• Children are to be transferred to the Zerpyosh military camp in Tikrit.They shall be transported together with our representative, using special vehicles. End.”
These documents are among the clearest pieces of evidence showing how the Ba‘ath regime systematically arrested, separated, and forcibly disappeared Kurdish civilians — men, women, and children — during the Anfal Genocide.
Sources
- Official documents of the collapsed Ba‘ath regime.
- MEW, The Genocide in Iraq and the Anfal Campaign against the Kurds.
- Documents of the Political Bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
- Field investigations and research (follow-up and interviews).
- Magazines and newspapers of the Ba‘ath era.
* Note on Sultan Hashim:
Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad Muhammad al-Tai served in the Fourth Division as commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade, then as commander of the Fourth Division, later as commander of the Fifth Army Corps, and finally as commander of the First Army Corps during the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988). He was one of the principal military leaders in charge of the Anfal operations.
Remark on terminology:
The terms used by the Ba‘ath regime in its documents — such as “bakrigraw (hireling/mercenary), têkder (saboteur), “criminal,” and many other degrading labels — were applied to any Kurd (except the collaborators known as “Jash”), whether Peshmerga or civilian. In this text, these terms are quoted exactly as they appear in the original documents, to preserve the historical record and reveal the dehumanizing language used by the regime as part of its genocidal policy.
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